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DOES GIDEON STILL MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
Thomas F Liottit
"There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a
man gets depends on the amount of money he has."1
I. INTRODUCTION
March 18, 1998 marked thirty-five years since the United
States Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright,2 the landmark
case affirming an indigent defendant's right to appointed counsel.
Since Gideon was decided, crime has increased and our prisons
seem to be growing faster than private enterprise. As a society, we
seem to believe that it is far better to be punitive and to imprison
offenders than it is to provide meaningful educational and eco-
nomic opportunity, as well as true rehabilitation programs and al-
ternative sentences. A significant portion of the population feels
strongly that we should have a death penalty. A federal death pen-
alty statute exists and recently New York State's governor and legis-
lature have dehumanized our state by enacting one. Life and
death hang in the balance. So does our dignity as a civilization.
While these severe penalties have been injected into our crimi-
nal justice system, we provide only the most cursory defense serv-
ices to the poor. Public defender budgets are routinely slashed to
the bare bone. Lawyers who serve the poor zealously strive to pro-
vide effective legal representation, yet they are overrun by the supe-
t J.D. 1976; M.P.A. 1972; B.S. 1970. Mr. Liotti is Past President of the New York
State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; the Editor of the Criminal Justice Sec-
tion Journal of the New York State Bar Association; Village Justice of Westbury, Long
Island, New York; and co author of VILLAGE, TowN, AND DISTRICT COURTS IN NEW
YoRK (1997). He was the founder and first chair of the Assigned Counsel Sub-Com-
mittee for State and Federal Courts of the Criminal Law and Procedure Committee of
the Bar Association of Nassau County, Inc. and created the name "Gideon Day" for
the annual pilgrimage by lawyers to the State Legislature to lobby for increased fund-
ing and rates for assigned counsel attorneys statewide. He also served on a committee
of his County Bar Association which recommended the first MCLE program for law-
yers in the state as a condition for continued membership on the Nassau County
assigned counsel panel. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of his law
clerk Jason Spector in the research and drafting of this article. The author also
thanks the New York State Defenders Association and the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers for the data, literature and research materials that they
provided and which assisted in the preparation of this article.
1 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
2 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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rior resources of law enforcement and the Government. The lack
of funding for defense services for the poor makes a mockery of
justice.
Counsel assigned to federal cases in New York receive $75 per
hour for in-court and out-of-court time,3 less arbitrary reductions
made by judges who seem to retaliate against them for being
strong advocates.4 A commission appointed by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist has recommended that judges be removed from the process
of approving these fees.5 The federal judiciary has chosen to ig-
nore these recommendations.6
In New York State courts, assigned lawyers work for the paltry
sums of $40 per hour for in-court time and $25 per hour for out-of-
court time.7 Only their dedication to equal justice and their com-
mitment to the spirit of Gideon keeps them working. Pay vouchers
are routinely delayed, arbitrarily reduced, or lost by mean-spirited
judges. Many of these jurists were never defense lawyers or, if they
were, it was a long time ago and their memories appear to have
dimmed.
We must look beyond the sensational case and remember
what is at stake for the indigent defendant. While we routinely
under-represent the poor in criminal cases, the government brands
them with the scarlet letter of criminal conviction. When a citizen
who has no prior convictions pleads guilty to a felony, that person
can no longer apply for many jobs or aspire to many careers,8 or
ever vote in a general election.9 Without a substantial cadre of well
trained and uninhibited defense lawyers, our adversarial system of
justice simply breaks down. The end result is that society's most
powerless citizens are methodically disenfranchised without any
certainty that their convictions are just.
In spite of obstinate and uncomprehending opposition by the
3 SPANGENBERG GROUP, SURVEY OF INDIGENT DEFENSE PROVISIONS By STATE (1992).
4 SPANGENBERG GROUP, RATES OF COMPENSATION PAID TO COURT-APPOINTED COUN-
SEL IN NON-CAPrrAL FELONY CASES AT TRIAL (October 1997); see also Thomas F. Liotti &
Harriet B. Rosen, Review of the Report on the CriminalJustice Act, N.Y. L.J., Outside Coun-
sel Column, Nov. 17, 1992 at 1, 7; THE MOUTHPIECE (A publication of the New York
State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers), Nov./Dec. 1992 at 19.
5 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT REVIEW
COMMITTEE: INTERIM REPORT, (1992), reprinted in 51 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2335, 2337
(Aug. 19, 1992).
6 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE FEDERAL DEFENDER PROGRAM, (1993), reprinted in
53 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2003, 2010 (Apr. 14, 1993).
7 N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722-b (McKinney 1991).
8 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 751-55 (McKinney 1981).
9 N.Y. ELEc. LAW § 5-106 (McKinney 1998).
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state legislature, the New York State Defenders Association, Inc.
helps criminal defense attorneys by providing research, briefs, tran-
scripts, and strategic and tactical advice. Criminal defense lawyers
all too often must wage a lonely fight for justice with nothing more
than the fire in their bellies. On the thirty-fifth anniversary of
Gideon, it's time to give more than just tacit support to that
landmark decision. Lawyers must have the tools to fight-without
them, all of us are in danger.
Part II of this article inquires into the spirit of Gideon. It dis-
cusses the history of court-appointed counsel to represent the indi-
gent and the breakdown of that system around the turn of the
century. Next, it analyzes federal and state cases that led up to
Gideon. Finally, it describes New York State's statutory response to
Gideon.
Parts III and IV address several causes of action that hopefully
will spur litigation on behalf of indigent defendants. Part III de-
scribes United States Supreme Court treatment of indigent defend-
ants and fundamental rights, with special emphasis on equal
protection. Part IV addresses the quality of representation for indi-
gent defendants in New York. Finally, Part V concludes with a gen-
eral litigation strategy for the fight for equal justice for the poor.
II. THE SPIRIT OF GIDE-ON
A. The History of Court Appointed Counsel
Courts have looked to the historical obligations of the bar to
justify their own power to appoint and the lawyer's duty to serve.10
Some commentators claimed to have discovered the roots of ap-
pointed counsel in Roman history." However, other commenta-
tors question the support for this premise. 2 Historical English and
American case law have been used to justify the appointment of
attorneys to serve the indigent.' The English tradition also sup-
ports the attorneys' obligation to accept court appointments.1 4
10 See, e.g., Salas v. Cortez, 593 P.2d 226, 229-30 (Cal. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
900 (1979).
11 SeeJohn MacArthur Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 Hav. L. Rkw. 361,
385 (1923).
12 See David L. Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. RE-v.
735, 73948 (1980).
13 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 72-73 (1932); see also White v. Board of Com-
missioners, 537 So. 2d 1376, 1379 (Fla. 1989); State v. Remeta, 547 So. 2d 181, 182
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 636-37 (9th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
14 See Dillon, 346 F.2d at 636.
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Courts maintain that the history of appointment in England estab-
lished the bar's duty to serve the indigent without payment. 5
However, the English system does not establish this obligation.
16
The early reported cases demonstrate a mixed response by the
courts when faced with situations requiring appointment. In fact, a
number of cases that date back to the sixteenth century show that
defendants frequently had to beg the court for the assistance of
counsel, and regularly did so to no avail." Yet, this was not always
the case. The Ninth Circuit noted in United States v. Dillon'8 that
some English statutes and case law required certain attorneys to
render unpaid services to the indigent as officers of the court.19
Although mandatory court appointment burdened some privi-
leged members of the legal profession, 20 the claim that these spe-
cial appointments require an obligation by all attorneys today is
unfounded.
American courts have relied on the English tradition of court
appointment tojustify their own appointment of counsel with little
or no compensation. Although authorities disagree about the ex-
tent of the right to counsel during the colonial period,21 the his-
tory of that period demonstrates a general departure from the
English tradition of not appointing counsel. The colonial legisla-
tures produced a variety of statutes creating a right to counsel.22
The idea of appointed counsel was clearly on the minds of the
members of the Constitutional Convention. 2' There, three differ-
15 Id.
16 See Shapiro, supra note 12, at 744-49.
17 Id. at 743. See also Lord Lovat's Case, 18 How. St. Tr. 529, 578-79 (1746) (blind,
deaf invalid denied counsel); Scroop's Case, 5 How. St. Tr. 1034, 1043-46 (1660) (in-
carcerated defendant required to represent self); Howard's (Duke of Norfolk's) Case,
1 How. St. Tr. 957, 966-67 (1571) (defendant accused of high treason denied
counsel).
18 346 F.2d at 636.
19 But see Shapiro, supra note 12, at 743-49 (criticizing the court's selective use of
case law to establish that counsel was always appointed for the indigent in England).
20 See id. at 746. Historically, an officer of the court was the holder of public office,
usually a sergeant-at-law. A sergeant-at-law was granted unusual privileges not given to
other members of the bar and created a special strata within their own exclusive pro-
fession. This elite body alone bore the burden of mandatory service to the indigent.
Id.
21 See Shapiro, supra note 12, at 750.
22 See Note, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation,
73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1030 (1964) (noting that all states except Georgia and Rhode Is-
land had adopted some right to counsel statute by 1789).
23 See Felix Rackow, The Right to Counsel: English and American Precedents, 11 WM. &
MARY Q. 1, 24-25 (1954).
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ent versions of the Sixth Amendment were debated. 4 The final
version of the Amendment, entitling indigent defendants represen-
tation by an attorney, was very similar to the original proposed lan-
guage.25 The first Congress passed an Act that required the
appointment of counsel in capital cases.2 6
B. State Court Reaction
Three early decisions held on constitutional grounds that an
attorney could not be compelled to represent an indigent defend-
ant without compensation. The Supreme Court of Indiana in Webb
v. Baird,27 was the first to dismiss the historical justifications for
"gratuitous defense of a pauper."28 The Indiana Court recognized
the argument that an attorney has an "honorary" duty to aid the
indigent.29 However, the Court dismissed this claim as having no
place under state law or the United States Constitution.3" The
Court considered all professions equal. Therefore, none could be
subjected to the unique burden of providing services without
compensation.3 '
In Carpenter v. Dane County,32 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
repudiated court appointment without compensation on the same
grounds as Webb.3' The Iowa Supreme Court in Hall v. Washington
Co.,34 relied on the Fifth Amendment's takings clause to hold un-
constitutional court appointment without compensation. 5 The
Iowa Court ruled that the right to compensation was a fundamen-
tal right that would be violated by such an appointment.
36
By the close of the nineteenth century, the idea of compelled
representation without pay was losing acceptance. Generally, states
have rarely disciplined lawyers who refused to serve when ap-
24 See Note, supra note 22, at 1031.
25 See Rackow, supra note 23, at 24-25.
26 See Rackow, supra note 23, at 25-26 n.98.
27 6 Ind. 13 (1854).
28 Id. at 16-17.
29 Id. at 16.
30 Id. at 16-17.
31 Id.
32 9 Wis. 249 (1859).
33 Id. at 252.
34 2 Greene 473 (Iowa 1850).
35 Id. at 478.
36 Id. But see Samuels v. County of Debuque, 13 Iowa 536, 538 (1862) (holding
that lawyers must provide representation for a prescribed statutory fee based on the
theory that lawyers were officers of the court).
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pointed without compensation. Courts have held attorneys in
contempt for refusal to proceed as appointed counsel, but they
have been reluctant to exercise their judicial power to compel at-
torneys to serve the indigent.38 Lawyers began to assert that un-
compensated service constituted an excessive burden.
C. Challenges to Appointment Without Provisions for Compensation
Many courts accepted the argument that uncompensated ser-
vice constituted an excessive burden and found challenges to
mandatory court appointments both compelling and cognizable.
For example, in In re Nine Applications for Appointment of Counsel in
Title VII Proceedings,39 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama held the Title VII provision granting
courts the discretion to compel representation without provision
for payment unconstitutional, as it allowed for the creation of a
form of involuntary servitude prohibited by the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.4 ° The court distinguished between the fundamental right to
defend oneself against criminal charges and the right to initiate a
civil lawsuit.'" The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals later vacated the
decision .42
The Nine Applications holding was subsequently rejected by
most circuit courts addressing the issue. To justify uncompensated
service by appointed counsel, courts relied on the public service
exception which is grounded in a line of cases permitting the state
to call its citizens into temporary service. The Supreme Court's
holding in Hurtado v. United States,44 practically assured the applica-
tion of the public service exception to court appointment chal-
lenges by reinforcing the public service exception when applied to
criminal justice proceedings.4" The Hurtado Court held that the
attorney's duty to represent the indigent was analogous to the pub-
37 J.W. Thomey, Annotation, Attorney's Refusal to Accept Appointment to Defend Indi-
gent, or to Proceed in such Defense, as Contempt, 36 A.L.R. 3d 1223-24 (1990).
38 See id. at 1224.
39 475 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ala. 1979).
40 Id. at 88.
41 Id. at 92.
42 See White v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 646 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1981).
43 See Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1973); Butler v. Perry, 240
U.S. 328, 333 (1916).
44 410 U.S. 578 (1973).
45 Id. at 588-89. However, the application of the public service exception has been
limited. In Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966), the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the government's power to compel public service is restricted by
the requirement that the service bear a reasonable relation to the state's needs. Id. at
131-32.
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lic's duty to provide evidence in criminal cases.4 6
Utilization of the public service exception to court appoint-
ment prevents Thirteenth Amendment challenges because the vol-
untary nature of the service may be imputed from the attorney's
oath taken upon entrance to the bar. Other fundamental policies
form the foundation of court appointment rather than instances
where the state temporarily requires the services of its citizens.4 7
In United States v. Dillon,48 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected a deprivation of property challenge to uncompensated
court appointment.49 The Dillon court held that lawyers have a
professional responsibility to render unpaid services.5" To find a
deprivation, due process analysis requires the court to determine
that a taking of property has occurred.5 The court disposed of
this question by holding that no taking of services occurs with court
appointments because lawyers by implication consent to service
upon entering the profession.52 The court reasoned that lawyers
owed this duty as officers of the court.
The Dillon rationale has commanded a wide following in both
state and federal courts.5' However this rationale appears untena-
ble in light of the Supreme Court's current test for examining tak-
ings. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,55 the Court
noted that courts have held a taking exists when the state directs
"acquisitions of resources to permit or facilitate uniquely public
functions."56 Court appointments facilitate a public function be-
cause appointment allows the state to fulfill the duty imposed upon
it by Gideon and subsequent cases.
In Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,57 the Supreme Court held
that no compensation will be awarded unless there is a showing
that the means are "unduly oppressive" to the petitioner. 58 Some
46 410 U.S. at 589.
47 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
48 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965).
49 Id. at 635-36.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 635.
52 Id. at 635-36.
53 Id.
54 See White v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 646 F.2d 203, 205 (5th Cir.
1981); Tyler v. Lark, 472 F.2d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864
(1973); Dolan v. United States, 351 F.2d 671, 672 (5th Cir. 1965);Jackson v. State, 413
P.2d 488, 490 (Alaska 1966).
55 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
56 Id. at 128.
57 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
58 Id. at 594-95 (quoting Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)).
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courts have used an analysis similar to the one used in Goldblatt to
address takings challenges to court appointment. 59 Courts which
implicitly follow Goldblalt have found that compensation systems vi-
olate the Fifth Amendment. Moreover, some decisions declare
that uncompensated appointments are ipso facto violative of the
Fifth Amendment.6
D. Dominance of the States
The original Constitution ratified in 1789 contained few refer-
ences to individual rights. 6 1 Its major concern was the structure of
the new federal government. However, the ratification debates re-
vealed a popular demand for additional constitutional protections
of individual and state's rights. The response to these pressures
was the introduction and ratification of the first ten amendments,
the Bill of Rights, in 1791.62
There was little opportunity for the Supreme Court to inter-
pret the Bill of Rights before the Civil War. The first century of
constitutional decisions was marked by a concentration on struc-
tural issues; the respective roles of the national and federal govern-
ments as well as the tripartite separation of powers at the national
level.6" Moreover, ChiefJustice Marshall would lay to rest any chal-
lenges to state supremacy in the landmark case of Barron v. Mayor
and City Council of Baltimore.' Barron sued the City for ruining the
use of his wharf in Baltimore harbor.65 Justice Marshall, ordinarily
not adverse to nationalistic interpretations, held that the Bill of
59 See People ex reL Conn. v. Randolph, 219 N.E.2d 337 (Ill. 1966) (holding trial
court may reimburse court-appointed attorney beyond amount authorized by statute
where attorney would otherwise "suffer an intolerable sacrifice and burden"). Id. at
340; Kansas ex reL Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816 (Kan. 1987) (holding a violation of
the Fifth Amendment has occurred when an attorney is required to advance expense
funds without full reimbursement or "is required to spend an unreasonable amount
of time on indigent appointments so that there is genuine and substantial interfer-
ence with his or her private practice"). Id. at 842; Daines v. Markoff, 555 P.2d 490
(Nev. 1976).
60 See Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 447 P.2d 193, 195 (Utah 1968); Bradshaw v.
Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294, 298 (Ky. 1972); McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, 16 (Iowa
1982).
61 Stewart F. Hancock Jr., The State Constitution, A Criminal Lauryer's First Line of
Defense, 57 ALB. L. REv. 271, 278 (1993); see generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SER-
VICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA-
ANALYSIS & INTERPRETATION, SENATE DOCUMENT No. 103-6 (1996) [hereinafter CONSTI-
TUTION ANNOTATED].
62 U.S. CONST. amend. I-X.
63 See generally CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED, supra note 61.
64 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
65 Id. at 244.
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Rights restricted only the federal government and did not limit
state authority.66 Marshall pointed to the fears about encroach-
ments of the new national government expressed during the ratify-
ing conventions. 67 Noting that the citizens had adopted not only
the Federal Constitution but separate, and sometimes different,
constitutions for the states, he saw the Bill of Rights as limiting only
the government established by the Federal Constitution.68
The result of the Barron holding was that neither the Supreme
Court nor the lower federal courts were able to exercise meaning-
ful control over the substance or procedures embodied in state law.
Therefore, issues surrounding the appointment of counsel without
provision for compensation were settled on the state level without
consideration of the Sixth Amendment. The Constitution enabled
the Supreme Court to provide federal protection of individuals
and groups against governmental overreaching. This role would
eventually expand with the passage of the Post-Civil War
Amendments.
1. Enactment of the Civil War Amendments and
Early Interpretations
After Barron the Constitution afforded individuals few safe-
guards against state action. The Civil War itself would radically al-
ter that picture. From an historical perspective, the Civil War was
about slavery and emancipation.69 From a legal standpoint, the fo-
cus of the Civil War was federalism - a group of states asserting their
prerogative over increasing federal interference into their way of
life.7" The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments,
passed in the wake of the Civil War, were a reaction to these causes
of extreme divisiveness.
The Slaughter House Cases,71 the Supreme Court's first interpre-
tation of the Civil War amendments, stated that the purpose of the
amendments was to bar discrimination by the states against
blacks, 2 but the court rejected the opportunity to give the amend-
ments reach beyond the issues that spawned them. The Court
proved unwilling to conclude that the Fourteenth Amendment lim-
66 Id. at 250-51.
67 Id. at 250.
68 Id. at 247-48.
69 BRUCE CArtON, THE CMVL WAR 10 (1960).
70 Id. at 8-10.
71 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
72 Id. at 71-72. See also David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Civil
Rights and Liberties, 1930-1941, 5 DUKE L.J. 800, 805 & n.90 (1987).
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ited the states' powers. 71 In its interpretation, the majority relied
on the historical background of the amendments and concluded
that they were not to be read to "radically change the whole theory
of the relations of the State and Federal Government to each other
and both of these governments to the people. ' 74 Additionally, the
court reasoned that they would not create a "perpetual censor
upon all legislation of the States, on the civil rights of their own
citizens. 75
The growth of industrialization and corporate power in the
post-Civil War years led to popular demands and legislative re-
sponses. New regulatory laws clashed with the economic laissez-faire
theories of Adam Smith and the Social Darwinism embraced by
writers such as Herbert Spencer.76 During those clashes, ideas
such as survival of the fittest, the defense of economic inequalities,
and governmental hands-off policies found their way into legal
briefs and found responsive listeners on the bench.7 7 Thus, the
seeds of substantive due process began to surface in majority
opinions.
The Supreme Court increasingly began to question state regu-
lations 78 and eventually began to overturn them based on the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 79 The focus of the
Court's scrutiny was economic regulation that conflicted with the
Court's laissez-faire theory of minimal governmental interference
with business. The most infamous of these economic regulation
cases was Lochner v. New York.8" At issue was a New York law which
limited the hours a bakery employee could work.8 The Court
struck down this law as an abridgment of liberty of contract and a
violation of substantive due process.82 The Lochner era had begun.
73 83 U.S. at 78.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 See Mark G. Yuduf, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Sex Discrimination: One
Small Cheer for Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1366, 1389 (1990).
77 Id. at 1389-90 (describing Justice Holmes chastisement of his fellow justices for
reading Herbert Spencer's brand of utilitarian philosophy into the Constitution); see
also H. SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS 106 (1865).
78 See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 132-34 (1877) (deferring to the legislature's
judgment on the issue but indicating a willingness to determine what regulations were
"reasonable").
79 SeeAllgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591-92 (1897) (striking down a Louisiana
statute which prohibited anyone from obtaining insurance on Louisiana property
from any company not licensed in Louisiana).
80 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
81 Id. at 46.
82 Id.
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Cases of the Lochner era had much in common. First, the
Court was highly suspicious of legislative motives.8 3 The Justices
looked only at the legislature's actual motive, not a hypothetical
one, and would often go so far as to substitute their own interpreta-
tion. For example, in Lochner, the Court rejected the proposition
that the law at issue was intended to regulate health and safety.8 4
Instead, the Court saw the law as a regulation of labor conditions
which interfered with liberty of contract.85 Second, the Court con-
tinually refused to defer to legislative findings of fact.86 The Court
concluded, "[i] t is not... possible to discover the connection be-
tween the number of hours a baker may work in the bakery and the
healthful quality of the bread made by the workman."87
Lochner symbolizes the rise of substantive due process as a pro-
tection of economic and property rights. 88 For the next three de-
cades the Court intensely scrutinized economic regulations and
frequently struck them down. Lochner and the judicial philosophy
behind it were subjected to intense criticism.
The election of Franklin Roosevelt and the promise of the
New Deal programs convinced many of the need for aggressive leg-
islation to ensure the nation's economic survival. Such large scale
government intervention in economic affairs was clearly at odds
with the Lochnerfreedom of contract philosophy. As a result, in the
mid-1930s, judicial intervention in economic legislation began to
gradually decline. 89 The use of substantive due process to give spe-
cial protection to economic and property rights was discredited.9"
The economic regulation cases are useful to the understand-
ing of Gideon because they focused on the judicial power used to
protect individual liberties. These cases changed the relationship
between federal judges and legislative bodies by changing their
powers to determine the scope of "liberty." The new question that
arose would be the pace and nature of this change.
83 Id. at 62-63.
84 Id. at 57.
85 Id. at 61.
86 Id. at 62.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 45.
89 See William Michael Treanor, Jam For Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of
Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 813, 865 (1998).
90 Id.
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2. The Rise of Procedural Due Process and the
Incorporation Debate
Change in court personnel, together with Roosevelt's court
packing plan, contributed to a philosophical shift toward greater
deference to legislation in economic affairs. 1 Cases such as Nebbia
v. New York,9 2 explicitly, and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,93 implic-
itly, abandoned the Lochner philosophy. The battlefield having
shifted, the new competing views became selective and total
incorporation.
The selective incorporation approach denies that the entire
Bill of Rights is made applicable to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment. Instead, only those aspects of liberty that are in some
sense "fundamental" are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
against state interference. Justices Cardozo and Frankfurter were
the two best-known proponents of the selective incorporation, fun-
damental rights approach. In Palko v. Connecticut,94 Justice Car-
dozo articulated the selective incorporation test as being whether
the Bill of Rights guarantee is "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."9 5 The proponents of selective incorporation also hold that
the Bill of Rights does not set outside limits on the concept of
liberty.96
The contrary view, total incorporation, asserts that all of the
guarantees specified in the Bill of Rights are made applicable to
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
The best known proponent of this view was Justice Black, whose
position fell one vote short of becoming law in Adamson v. Califor-
91 WiLLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 1932-
1940, 231-37 (1963).
92 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (holding that the use of private property and the making of
private contracts are free from governmental interference, but neither property rights
nor contract rights are absolute: they are subject to public regulation when the public
need requires. Regulation of this liberty is constitutional as long as it is not unreason-
able, arbitrary and capricious, and the means selected are real and substantially re-
lated to the ends).
93 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (holding that property and contract rights are subject to
regulation as long as the regulation is reasonable and the means selected are genuine
and substantially related to the ends).
94 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
95 Id. at 325.
96 See, eg., In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 359 (1970) (a selective incorporation deci-
sion holding that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is among the "essentials of due
process and fair treatment" and therefore binding on state trials even though no spe-
cific Bill of Rights provision imposes such a requirement) (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1, 13 (1967)).
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nia.Y In his dissent, Justice Black argued that the procedural guar-
antees applied to the federal government through the Fifth
Amendment were automatically rendered applicable to the states
via the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 Justice Black argued that this
was the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.99
Moreover, in his view, the majority's fundamental rights approach
allowed the Court "to roam at large in the broad expanses of policy
and morals and to trespass, all too freely, on the legislative domain
of the States as well as the Federal Government."'100
Although the Supreme Court has continued to adhere, in the-
ory at least, to the selective incorporation fundamental rights ap-
proach, the Warren Court sped up the process by which individual
Bill of Rights guarantees were incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment." 1 Today, virtually the entire Bill of Rights has been
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, one guarantee at a
time. 1 2 In the process, the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due
Process Clause in particular, has come to protect the values of a
vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing reach of government
officials.
1 0 3
3. The Constitutional Right of Indigent Defendants to
Appointed Counsel
The Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . .. to
have assistance of counsel for his defense."'0 4 It was obvious from
the outset that this provision guaranteed a right to representation
by privately retained counsel. Whether the Sixth Amendment also
included an obligation of the state to provide counsel for the indi-
gent defendant was far less certain.10 5
97 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
98 Id. at 68-92 (Black, J., dissenting).
99 Id. at 72, 74-75.
100 Id. at 90.
101 See Rachel E. Fugate, Comment, The Florida Constitution: Still Champion of Citizen's
Rights?, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. Rhv. 87, 91 (1997).
102 See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 91 n.32. Bill of Rights guarantees not incorporated into
the Fourteenth Amendment are the Fifth Amendment's prohibition of criminal trials
without grand jury indictment and the Seventh Amendment's right to a jury in civil
cases.
103 See id. at 91.
104 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
105 SeeJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (requiring federal courts to provide
indigent defendants with appointed counsel in criminal cases); But cf. Betts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455 (1942) (holding that an indigent defendant in a non-capital case had to
show that he had been prejudiced without a lawyer and that special circumstances
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1. Right to Appointed Counsel in Felony Cases
Powell v. Alabama0 6 was the first United States Supreme Court
case to recognize a constitutional right to court appointed coun-
sel.10 7 In Powell, nine black youths had been charged with the rape
of two white girls near Scottsboro, Alabama. 108 Amid a popular
frenzy, the defendants who were under the constant guard of the
state militia were rushed to trial.' °9 Eight of the youths were con-
victed and the jury imposed the death sentence. 10 The Supreme
Court held that the defendants were denied effective appointment
of counsel. 111
Powell was decided under the then prevailing "fundamental
fairness" analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause. According to the Court, the right to appointed counsel
derived from the due process right to a fair hearing." 2 The indi-
gent defendant was entitled to a fair hearing,1 13 just as the more
affluent defendant who could afford to retain a lawyer. The Powell
opinion stressed that "[t]he right to be heard would be, in many
cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard
by counsel."" 4 Accordingly, the state had a due process obligation
to provide the indigent defendant with a lawyer where the assist-
ance of counsel was essential to achieve a fair hearing.1' 5 However,
the majority limited the holding of Powell to the specific facts
before the court.'
1 6
Six years later, in Johnson v. Zerbst,117 the Supreme Court held
that the right to appointed counsel was found in the Sixth Amend-
ment."1 8 The Court discarded the fundamental fairness interpreta-
existed, such as defendant's ignorance, illiteracy, etc., to make the proceedings inher-
ently unfair); But see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (overturned Belts and
held that court appointed counsel is a fundamental right stating, "[w]e think the
Court in Betts was wrong... in concluding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of
counsel is not one of these fundamental rights"). Id. at 342.
106 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
107 Id. at 71.
108 Id. at 49.
109 Id. at 51.
110 Powell v. State, 141 So. 201, 203 (Ala. 1932).
111 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
112 Id. at 71.
113 Id. at 72-73.
114 Id. at 68-69.
115 Id. at 71.
116 Id.
117 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
118 Id. at 462-63.
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tion in favor of the selective incorporation analysis" 9 that made
the Sixth Amendment directly applicable to the states.1 20 Its inter-
pretation of the Sixth Amendment rested heavily upon the analysis
of the need for counsel first suggested by Justice Sutherland in his
opinion for the Court in Powell 12 1 Johnson involved a federal prose-
cution in which two indigent defendants were charged with coun-
terfeiting. The defendants argued that they had been refused
appointed counsel because counterfeiting is not a capital
offense. 122
Justice Black, writing for the majority, held that a trial without
counsel violated the Sixth Amendment because the right to coun-
sel applies to "all criminal prosecutions."1 23 Relying heavily on the
language in Powell, that the right to be heard would be of little
value without assistance of counsel, Justice Black noted that the av-
erage defendant does not have the requisite skill to protect himself
in a criminal trial.1 24 Therefore, in federal court, a defendant
could not be deprived of the right to assistance of counsel unless
the defendant waived that right.1
25
This right applied to all criminal defendants, including those
who were unable to afford counsel. 126 The Court viewed the right
to counsel as a constitutionally defined element of a criminal trial
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 12 Therefore, it was the trial
court's affirmative obligation to see that the accused was given this
right.12' Furthermore, in the case of an indigent defendant, ap-
pointed counsel was required unless he knowingly and intelligently
waived this right.
129
For another twenty-five years the Supreme Court refused to
extend the Johnson holding to state courts. Even though the Court
in Johnson held that the Sixth Amendment required appointed
counsel in all federal felony cases, state courts were not compelled
to employ more than the "fundamental fairness" test of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 30 Accordingly, in Betts v. Brady,'3 a the Court
119 Id. at 467-68.
120 Id. at 465-66.
121 Id. at 462-63.
122 Id. at 460.
123 Id. at 463.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 468-69.
126 Id. at 464.
127 Id. at 467.
128 Id. at 468.
129 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 464-65 (1942).
130 Id. at 466.
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW
held that due process required the appointment of counsel only
where special circumstances of the particular case demonstrated
that the indigent defendant would need a lawyer to obtain a fair
trial. 13 2 Capital cases such as Powell presented an example of these
special circumstances. However, the need for appointed counsel
could also be shown in cases where the nature of the offense or the
possible defenses raised complex legal questions 13 3 or the personal
characteristics of the defendant, such as youthfulness or incapac-
ity' 34 raised the issue.
The Court in Gideon v. Wainright,135 rejected the special cir-
cumstances test of Betts and extended the right to appointed coun-
sel in state cases to all indigent felony defendants. 36 The Court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Sixth
Amendment and made appointment of counsel applicable to the
states in all criminal prosecutions. 37 Gideon established the re-
quirement that a lawyer's assistance was necessary to guarantee a
fair trial. 138 Therefore, if a defendant was unable to afford an at-
torney, the court had to appoint one for his defense.
139
In both Johnson and Gideon the Court viewed the Sixth Amend-
ment as defining the basic elements of a fair trial and included the
assistance of counsel among those elements. 4 In Johnson, Justice
Black viewed the Sixth Amendment as imposing a single counsel
requirement, designed to assure a fair trial.' Following that
premise, no Sixth Amendment distinction should exist between
the indigent and affluent criminal defendant as to the basic right
of representation by counsel.
2. Right to Appointed Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases
Until 1972 all of the appointed counsel cases decided by the
Supreme Court had involved felony prosecutions. 4 2 In Argersinger
131 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
132 Id. at 462, 472-73.
133 See, e.g., Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514
(1968).
134 See, e.g., Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 45-
46 (1945); Canizo v. New York, 327 U.S. 82, 83-84 (1946); Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S.
134, 137-38 (1947).
135 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
136 Id. at 339.
137 Id. at 341-42.
138 Id. at 344.
139 Id.
140 See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 468; Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
141 304 U.S. at 467-68.
142 See Argensinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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v. Hamlin,4 ' the Supreme Court held that the right to appointed
counsel applied to petty offenses.'44 The Court noted that the
problems associated with petty offenses might call for the appear-
ance of counsel to assure a fair trial because the legal issues raised
in misdemeanor trials were not less complex just because the jail
sentence could not exceed six months.1 45 Moreover, misdemean-
ors created a special need for counsel because the large number of
such offenses often caused an "obsession for speedy dispositions,
regardless of the fairness of the result.'
46
The defendant in Argersinger had been sentenced to jail, but
the Court declined to delineate the imposition of jail time as the
standard for the requirement of appointed counsel. 147 However,
the opinion laid the foundation for differentiating between cases
involving sentences of imprisonment and those involving an impo-
sition of a fine.'48 It did this by highlighting the special nature of
punishment that led to the loss of liberty.' 49 Moreover, the opin-
ion cited the practicability of an actual imprisonment standard. 5 °
Therefore, Argersinger only required that counsel be appointed
where there was an actual deprivation of personal liberty.1
5 1
In Scott v. Illinois,'52 the Court refused to extend the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel beyond the actual imprisonment
standard suggested in Argersinger. In Scott, the petitioner was
charged with shoplifting, which carried a penalty of a fine, impris-
onment, or both. 53 The defendant was convicted and only a fine
was imposed. 54 In a 5-4 decision, the Court concluded that the
Federal Constitution did not require state courts to appoint coun-
sel in this case. 15 5 The majority read Argersinger as resting on the
conclusion that the loss of liberty due to incarceration was so harsh
a penalty that due process required counsel to be appointed to
protect the defendant's interests. 56 The mere possibility that im-
143 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
144 Id. at 40.
145 Id. at 33.
146 Id. at 34.
147 Id. at 39.
148 Id. at 38-39.
149 Id. at 37-40.
150 Id. at 39. (quoting A.B.A. PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROVID-
ING DEFENSE SERVICES (Approved Draft 1968)).
151 407 U.S. at 40.
152 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
153 Id. at 368.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 373-74.
156 Id. at 372-73.
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prisonment could be imposed did not invoke the right to
counsel.1
5 7
Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Scott stressed the major-
ity's reliance on the fact that the actual imprisonment standard
would provide clear guidance to lower courts. 158 Hejoined the ma-
jority reluctantly, preferring instead a flexible case-by-case adjudi-
cation of the need for appointed counsel in petty offense cases.
159
In ArgersingerJustice Powell urged consideration of a series of fac-
tors in petty offense cases, including the complexity of the offense,
the probable sentence, the competency of the individual to repre-
sent himself, and the "attitude of the community" toward the par-
ticular crime.1 6 ° In light of the subsequent cases building upon
Argersinger, it appears that the Court would not retreat from the
requirement of counsel in actual imprisonment cases. 1 6 1 The close
division among the Court in Scott combined with Justice Powell's
reluctant concurrence holds open the possibility that the Court
might revisit the issue of appointment of counsel in a particularly
compelling non-imprisonment misdemeanor case.
1 6 2
3. New York's Statutory Response to Gideon
Following the 1963 Gideon decision, states that had not previ-
ously made provisions to provide counsel for indigent defendants
scrambled to enact legislation. New York followed suit in 1965 by
amending Article 18 of the County Law, creating Article 18-B.
163
Article 18-B commands each county in New York State to sup-
ply representation to criminal defendants who are financially un-
able to obtain counsel.' 64 This representation must take one of
three forms: (1) representation by a public defender as provided
for by Article 18-A, 65 (2) representation provided by a private legal
aid bureau or society designated by the county, 16 6 (3) representa-
157 Id. at 373.
158 Id. at 374.
159 Id. at 374-75; see alsoJohn E. Nowak, Due Process Methodology in the Postincorpora-
tion World, 70J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 409 (1979).
160 See 407 U.S. at 64 (1972).
161 See, e.g., Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (holding uncounseled convic-
tion which resulted in fine could not be used as prior misdemeanor-theft conviction
to support harsher sentence in future sentencing preceding).
162 See Nowak, supra note 159, at 408-09.
163 N.Y. CouN-rY LAw § 722 (McKinney 1965) (current version at N.Y. CouNTr-v LAW
§ 722 (McKinney 1991)).
164 See N.Y. COUNTrY LAW § 722 (McKinney 1991).
165 See id § 722(1).
166 See id § 722(2).
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tion by private counsel pursuant to a plan designed by the bar asso-
ciation of each county,1 6 7 or (4) representation according to a plan
containing a combination of the foregoing. 6  Article 18-B also
provides compensation for investigative, expert, and other services
necessary for an adequate defense.
169
Compensation for private attorneys was provided for under
section 722-b.170 As enacted in 1965, rates were fixed at fifteen dol-
lars per hour for in-court time and ten dollars per hour for out-of-
court time.' 71 Limits were placed on the total compensation an
attorney could receive at five hundred dollars for cases involving
felonies and three hundred dollars for cases involving misdemean-
ors with an option provided for compensation in excess of those
limits if provided by the court.1 7 2 In 1966, section 722-b was
amended to allow attorneys to receive payment during the course
of representation.
71
Article 18-B was passed with much fanfare. Governor Nelson
Rockefeller noted, "New York has always been a leader in the pro-
tection of the rights of its citizens and the passage of 18-B
mark[ed] another great step in that direction. "17  In addition to
the Governor, supporters included the Attorney General, deans of
law schools, the State Administrator of the Judicial Conference, the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the Chairman of the
Commission to Revise the Penal Law and the Code of Criminal
Procedure, many local bar associations, and the Joint Conference
on Legal Education.1 75 Opponents were concerned with 18-B's ef-
fect on home rule 19176 and the costs placed on the counties,
1 77
relative to the differences in the cost of living in more populated
167 See id § 722(3).
168 See id. § 722(4).
169 See id. § 722-c.
170 See id. § 722-b.
171 N.Y. CouNrv LAw § 722-b (McKinney 1965).
172 Id.
173 N.Y. CouN=rv LAW § 722-b (McKinney 1966) (current version at N.Y. CouNTY
LAW § 722-b (McKinney 1991)).
174 Memorandum filed with: Assembly Bill, Introductory Number 2233, Senate
Print Number 5744 and Assembly Bill, Introductory Number 4786, Senate Print
Number 7273.
175 See Bill Jacket, L. 1965, c. 878.
176 Id. Resolution of the Board of Supervisors of Montgomery County (June 8,
1965); Letter from F. Clark Hamlin, Clerk, Jefferson County Board of Supervisors, to
Governor Nelson Rockefeller (May 28, 1965).
177 See id. Letter from Irving Libenson, County Attorney, Westchester County, to Sol
Neil Corbin, Counselor to the Governor (June 30, 1965).
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areas as compared to those of rural areas. 178
Statutory fees for trial counsel have been increased only twice
since 1965, to twenty-five dollars per hour for in-court time and
fifteen dollars per hour for out-of-court time in 1977, and forty dol-
lars per hour for in-court time and twenty-five dollars per hour for
out-of-court time in 1985.17' The equivalent increases in the caps
have brought them to $1,200 for cases involving felonies and $800
for cases involving misdemeanors. 8 ' As time passed, it became
more difficult to attract able attorneys to represent indigent de-
fendants181 which led to the "abuse and neglect" of indigent
cases. 18 2 Moreover, the consistently higher rates paid in the federal
court system acted to dissuade counsel from accepting state
cases. 183 Proponents of the increases hoped that they would en-
courage a greater number of attorneys to participate in the pro-
gram thereby reducing the individual caseload and providing
higher quality legal representation to those clients served by the
program. 184 The rates, which went into effect in 1986, have not
been increased since.
185
III. How THE LAW TREATS THE POOR
The Supreme Court has recognized that the right to counsel is
a fundamental right. 186 Counsel must not only be appointed for an
indigent defendant, but must also be paid. If a state establishes a
scheme to enact Gideon and affects another fundamental right, in-
justice may result. The injustice may not be just an inequitable dis-
tribution of social goods, but the imprisonment of people who do
not possess that item by which other social goods are valued.
Therefore, the concept of equal protection and the right to coun-
sel for indigent defendants points to inequalities that may impinge
directly on access to, or levels of, those rights.
178 See id. Letter from Benjamin I. Taylor, President, Mammamroneck-Harrison
Bar Association, to Sol Neil Corbin, Counselor to the Governor (Apr. 6, 1965).
179 N.Y. CouN-rv LAW § 722-b (McKinney 1991).
180 Id.
181 See Bill Jacket L. 1985, c.315 (Memorandum in Support of Increase in Rates as
per S.824/A.1216, Prepared by Joseph W. Bellacosa, Chief Administrator to the
Courts).
182 See id. (Budget Report on Bill, Prepared by State Senators Dunne, Johnson and
Goodhue).
183 See Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense: Pro-
moting Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice For All
Criminal Defendants, 31 Am. C~iM. L. REv. 73, 94-95 (1993).
184 Id.
185 N. Y. CouN'rY LAw § 722-b (McKinney 1991).
186 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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1. The Meaning of Indigency
Supreme Court opinions generally refer to the rights of an 'in-
digent defendant' without ever offering a specific definition of in-
digency. Federal and state appellate courts have established
guidelines defining indigency, 187 although studies suggest that trial
judges often will create their own standards.' 88 Most if not all
courts agree that indigency does not mean destitute. Generally,
courts consider the full range of defense expenses in light of the
defendant's current personal and financial situation."' Among
the most common considerations are income from employment,
real and personal property, number of dependents, outstanding
debt, and seriousness of the charge.19 ° The court will look to the
defendant's current earnings and assets, as well as his potential to
generate future income, but will disregard potential assistance
from friends and relatives.91
2. Equal Protection and Poverty in Constitutional Law
Decisions addressing legislative classifications based on wealth
began to attract the attention of the Supreme Court during the
Warren Era. The Warren Court expressed the idea that society has
a limited duty to lift some of the handicaps of poverty in some cir-
cumstances. 19 2 Equal protection of the law provided the vehicle
for the Warren Court to promote a constitutional vision of equal
justice for rich and poor alike. 93 On the other hand, the Burger
Court halted the expansion of the wealth classification doctrine
187 See Wade R. Habeeb, Annotation, Determination of Indigency of Accused Entitling
Him to Appointment of Counsel, 51 A.L.R. 3d 1108, 1111-14 (1973).
188 See Steven Duke, The Right to Appointed Counsel: Argersinger and Beyond, 12 Am.
CriM. L. RIEv. 601, 630 (1975); Ken Anderson, Indigency: The Need for a Definition, 5
TEX. S.U.L. Riv. 45, 47 (1978).
189 See, e.g., Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 159 F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1946) (estimated costs
of appeal); see also Morgan v. Rhay, 470 P.2d 180 (Wash. 1970) (attorney fees in light
of defendant's financial situation).
190 Williams v. Sup. Ct. of County of Stanislus, 38 Cal. Rptr. 291, 294 (Cal. Ct. App.
1964) (quoting Note, Representation of Indigents in California, 13 STAN. L. REv. 522
(1961)); see Assad-Faltas v. Univ. South Carolina, 971 F. Supp. 985 (D.S.C. 1997); see
also Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 45 (1974); Bramlett v. Peterson, 307 F. Supp. 1311
(D. Fla. 1969).
191 See Barry v. Brower, 864 F.2d 294, 299-300 (3rd Cir. 1988); see also United States
v. Viemont, 91 F.3d 946, 952 (7th Cir. 1996).
192 See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174-75 (1941); Harper v. Virginia Board
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966); McDonald v. Board of Education Commission-
ers of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969).
193 See Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); McDonald v.
Board of Education Commissioners of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969).
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into other areas.' 94 Significantly, the Burger Court abandoned the
rhetoric of the Warren Court, sacrificing both the spirit and letter
of the Warren Court's equal protection decisions.'95
A. The Rise of Equal Access
In Griffin v. Illinois,'9 6 the Supreme Court held that the state
must provide the indigent criminal appellant with a free transcript
of the trial when the bill of exceptions necessary for appellate re-
view could not be prepared without it.'97 Earlier decisions held
that a state was not required to provide appellate review of all crim-
inal convictions. 9 " However, the Court in Griffin reasoned that
once the state establishes an appellate system, that system must
treat rich and poor alike. 199 The majority viewed Illinois' justifica-
tions as irrational, 20 0 since there was no relevant relationship be-
tween ability to pay and guilt or innocence.20 '
In Douglas v. California,2 the issue was whether a state had to
appoint counsel for indigent defendants for their first appeal as of
right.20 1 In the procedure at issue, the California appellate courts
would determine whether the petitioner's claim had merit before
appointing counsel.2 4  The Supreme Court reaffirmed Griffin
holding, "[i]n either case the evil is the same: discrimination
against the indigent. For there can be no equal justice where the
kind of an appeal a man enjoys 'depends on the amount of money
he has.' "205 The Court in Douglas reasoned that California's right
of appeal violated due process because indigent defendants were
forced to make a preliminary showing of merit.20 6
Similarly, in Anders v. California,2°7 the Court sought to ensure
that court-appointed counsel would passionately represent their
194 See generally Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Function of Criminal Procedure: The War-
ren and Burger Courts Competing Idealogies, 72 GEO. L. J. 185 (1983).
195 See id.
196 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
197 Id. at 19.
198 See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1894).
199 351 U.S. at 19.
200 Id. at 17-18.
201 Id. at 19.
202 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
203 Id. at 355.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 355 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956)).
206 372 U.S. at 357.
207 386 U.S. 738 (1967); see alsoJenkins v. Coombe, 821 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1987)
(holding that the state appellate court committed a constitutional error by entertain-
ing a defendant's appeal without providing him with effective appellate counsel).
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clients regardless of the merits of their claims. 20 8 The issue in An-
ders was the constitutionality of California's withdrawal system,
which permitted court-appointed attorneys to remove themselves
from a case if they felt that the appeal was frivolous. 20 9 The
Supreme Court held that the process did not meet the constitu-
tional requirements of due process and equal protection, thus re-
quiring that counsel submit a brief suggesting any argument that
might support the appeal.2 10 The California court could then de-
cide the appeal on the merits by the same standard used for a non-
indigent appellee. 21' This "assure[s] penniless defendants the
same rights and opportunities on appeal-as nearly as practica-
ble-as are enjoyed by those persons who are in a similar situation
but who are able to afford the retention of private counsel."
212
These cases demonstrated the Court's commitment to equal
justice for the poor. The Court's fundamental rationale was to cre-
ate a protective rule to ensure equal treatment of indigent defend-
ants. 213 The Supreme Court imposed rules in cases like Anders so
that judges and lawyers may perceive an indigent's claim more crit-
ically.214 These rules provide indigent defendants with the tools to
draw attention to their claims. Moreover, they ensure that individ-
uals are treated equally without regard for their ability to pay and
are thus given an equal opportunity to preserve their liberty.
Further examples of these rules can be found where the
Supreme Court dealt with rights they had already deemed funda-
mental. In Gideon v. Wainright,215 the Court adopted a rule requir-
ing appointed counsel for every indigent criminal defendant
accused of a felony.216 Subsequently, in Argersinger v. Hamlin,217 the
Court extended Gideon to all prosecutions which resulted in impris-
onment for any term.218 This extension served as a hedge against
the "obsession for speedy dispositions, regardless of the fairness of
the result, '219 caused by the larger number of misdemeanor cases.
Moreover, the Court did not limit this rationale solely to right
208 Id. at 744-45.
209 Id. at 739-40 & n.2.
210 Id. at 744.
211 Id. at 744-45.
212 Id. at 745.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 744-45.
215 372 U.S 335 (1963).
216 Id. at 342-45.
217 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
218 Id. at 37.
219 Id. at 34.
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to counsel cases. For example, Harper v. Virginia Board of Elec-
lions,220 involved a challenge to Virginia's poll tax. 2 2 1 Like the right
of appeal from criminal convictions in Griffin, the franchise is not
independently guaranteed by the Constitution. Nevertheless, the
Court held that using wealth as a class to grant the vote to some
while denying it to others was a violation of equal protection. 222 As
in Griffin, the majority refused to legitimatize the purported fiscal
purposes served by the poll tax.22 3 Moreover, the Court expressed a
willingness to mandate the fiscal amounts the state must spend on
private services for private citizens.224 The court also suggested
that when there is a fundamental interest at stake, the state has a
duty to the indigent because the state bears a special responsibility
for the infringement of that right.
225
B. The Decline of Judicial Intervention on Behalf of the Poor
In the three decades since it was decided, Griffin spawned
many cases reaffirming the state's duties to the indigent defendant,
including Douglas. Douglas remained essentially untouched until it
was overturned by the Supreme Court in Ross v. Moffit. 2 2 6 Ross con-
cerned the state's duty to appoint counsel for indigent state prison-
ers seeking discretionary review. 227 The Court's holding, that states
did not have this duty22 8 was no different from the holding in Doug-
las. However, the rationale used in Ross was radically different.
The explicit elimination of wealth as a suspect classification
was noteworthy. The Court accomplished this by choosing not to
impose the cost of counsel for discretionary review on the states.2 2 9
The way the Court defined the issue of wealth within the equal
protection paradigm was more subtle, but in the end more devas-
tating to the cause of the poor. In Ross, the Court viewed Griffin
and its progeny as "stand [ing] for the proposition that a State can-
not arbitrarily cut off appeal rights for indigents while leaving open
avenues of appeal for more affluent persons."230  On the other
hand, the Court in Ross viewed Douglas as "an examination of
220 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
221 Id. at 664.
222 Id. at 670.
223 Id. at 668-69.
224 Id. at 668.
225 Id. at 670.
226 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
227 Id. at 602-03.
228 Id. at 610, 617-18.
229 Id. at 612.
230 Id. at 607.
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whether an indigent's access to the appellate system was ade-
quate."23 1 This subtle shift was a sign that the Court would no
longer proactively seek to level the playing field between the rich
and the poor.
Similarly, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
g-uez, 232 the Supreme Court chose to re-characterize laws that class-
ify people based on wealth. At issue in Rodriguez was Texas' system
of financing its public schools. 233 The state system guaranteed a
minimal level of state financing and permitted the individual dis-
tricts to raise additional revenues, usually through local property
taxes.234 This led to a gross disparity in educational spending be-
tween affluent and poor districts based solely on the underlying
property values.235 The Supreme Court chose to defer to the
state's legislative judgments on raising money and how to educate
children.236 More importantly, as further evidence of its retreat,
the Court would rely on federalism 237 to uphold a financing system
that existed in many states. 23 8 Ultimately it became apparent that
the Court would not guarantee equal access to education but
would only mandate that a threshold level be met, assuring at a
minimum that each child had a chance to acquire the basic
skills.
23 9
Following Ross and Rodriguez, the Court would vacillate on its
commitment to equal justice for the poor. In Lassiter v. Department
of Social Services,240 a 5-4 majority held that the state is not required
to pay for an attorney for an indigent woman whose child is being
taken away, but that such determinations should be made at the
trial court level on a case by case basis. 24 1 Justice Stewart's majority
opinion concluded that an indigent is preemptively entitled to
counsel only when faced with the risk of being deprived of physical
liberty.242 In the same year, the court decided Little v. Streater,243 in
which the petitioner gave birth to a child out of wedlock and was
231 Id.
232 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
233 Id. at 4-5.
234 Id. at 9-10.
235 Id. at 15-16.
236 Id. at 40-41.
237 Id. at 44.
238 Id. at 55.
239 Id. at 37.
240 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
241 Id. at 24-32.
242 Id. at 25-26.
243 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
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forced by the Connecticut Department of Social Services to bring a
paternity suit in order to qualify for welfare. 24 4 The Supreme
Court unanimously held that Connecticut's refusal to pay for the
blood tests needed to bring a paternity suit was a violation of due
process.2 4 5 The Court reasoned that the state played a "prominent
role in the litigation ' 246 and was required to pay for the blood tests
so that the petitioner would have a "meaningful opportunity to be
heard.
24 7
In Plyer v. Doe,248 the Court overturned a Texas law that denied
public education to the children of illegal aliens.249 Writing for the
majority, Justice Brennan acknowledged that states "have some au-
thority to act with respect to illegal aliens, at least where such ac-
tion mirrors federal objectives and furthers a legitimate state
goal. ' 250 He reasoned that the Texas law did not "operate harmo-
niously" with federal immigration law251 and that it served no state
interest, but to the contrary, only promoted "the creation and per-
petuation of a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries, surely
adding to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and
crime.
' 25 2
One principle established in Plyer is that a state may not pur-
sue policies which invariably create a permanent class of people
who are economically depressed and politically disadvantaged, and
indeed in some circumstances, the state may have a duty to spend
public money to avert creation of a permanent caste of the
underclass.
253
C. Equal Protection of the Laws and Article 18-B
As some recent media trials demonstrate, even to those who
are not familiar with the details of criminal defense work, the
wealthy can buy justice in our country. 254 The Supreme Court has
244 Id. at 15.
245 Id. at 16-17.
246 Id. at 6.
247 Id. at 5-6 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971)).
248 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
249 Id. at 228-30.
250 Id. at 225.
251 Id. at 226.
252 Id. at 230.
253 Id.
254 See generally Leroy D. Clark, All Defendants, Rich and Poor, Should Get Appointed
Counsel in Criminal Cases: The Route to True Equal Justice, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 47 (1997)
(discussing the notion thatjustice before the law, particularly criminal law, should not
depend on financial resources and that a "purchased" outcome in a criminal trial is
not tolerable).
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never required that the government neutralize the advantages of
wealth. You get what you pay for.
It is indisputable that the abysmally low rate paid to private
trial attorneys who represent the indigent in New York under sec-
tion 722 of Article 18-B of the New York County Law25 5 places indi-
gent criminal defendants at a substantial disadvantage. The
relative amount of money that New York pays private attorneys has
decreased since the passage of Article 18-B. A 1994 report adopted
by the House of Delegates of the New York State Bar Association
points out that despite the two increases in the rates paid to private
attorneys, the consumer price index has increased five times since
1965, amounting to a 44 percent decrease in terms of purchasing
power.256
The rates paid by New York State for non-capital cases are sig-
nificantly disproportionate to the federal rates, the rates paid by
other states, and the rates paid in New York for other types of legal
representation.257 New York rates are among the lowest in the
country despite its higher cost of doing business. 258 Thirty-one
states pay more for in-court time and thirty-two states pay more for
out-of-court time.259 Only seven states pay less than New York for
in-court time and only six for out-of-court time. 21 It would be fool-
ish to think that an indigent defendant charged with a crime in a
New York state court is receiving the same quality of representation
as an indigent defendant in a New York federal court.
The rates paid to private attorneys for other types of represen-
tation in New York indicate an implicit choice to provide a lower
level of representation to poor criminal defendants. Partners as-
signed under Public Officers Law Section 17 to represent state em-
ployees receive $100 per hour for in-court time and $75 per hour
for out-of-court work. 261 Associates with three years experience re-
ceive $75 and $50 respectively for the same work.2 6 2 In 1992, New
York City, which retains attorneys to represent the City and its
255 N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722 (McKinney 1991).
256 See STATEMENT ON ASSIGNED COUNSEL FEES. Criminal Justice Section of the New
York State Bar Association (Adopted at NYSBA Annual Meeting held in New York City
on January 28, 1994).
257 See Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 183, at 94.
258 See Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 183, at 93.
259 See SPANGENBERG GROUP, RATES OF COMPENSATION PAID TO COURT-APPOINTED
COUNSEL IN NON-CAPITAL FELONY CASES AT TRIAL (1997).
260 Id.
261 See "LEGAL FEES" SCHEDULE, NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF AUDIT AND CON-
TROL, BUREAU OF Co NRACTS AND STATE EXPENDITURES.
262 Id.
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agencies, established maximum rates for partners of $150 per hour
and for associates of $100 per hour. 26" These higher rates suggest
a disregard for the indigent criminal defendant's presumption of
innocence.
Unfortunately, these incredibly low rates have caused exper-
ienced trial attorneys to shun 18-B cases. Veteran attorneys either
leave the state 18-B panel or accept more federal cases, thereby
depleting the state panel. The current system yields two other in-
teresting results. First, the higher in-court rate causes attorneys to
devote more time in court even though out of court preparation
and investigation could result in speedier disposition of cases. Sec-
ond, if caps are exceeded before the case goes to trial, the attorney
could be faced with representing the client without a fee, which is
impermissible.26 4
IV. INDIGENCY AND EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
The Supreme Court first recognized a constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel in Powell v. Alabama.265 In Powell the
Court recognized that where due process requires the state to pro-
vide counsel for an indigent defendant, "that duty is not dis-
charged by an assignment at such a time or under such
circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the prep-
aration and trial of the case."2 66 Ten years later, in Glasser v. United
States,267 the Supreme Court held that there was a Sixth Amend-
ment violation when a judge denied a defendant the "right to have
the effective assistance of counsel." 26' Later, in Evitts v. Lucey,
269
the Supreme Court found that a defendant was entitled afortiori to
effective representation by retained counsel on a first appeal of
right.270 The Court noted that "a party whose counsel is unable to
provide effective representation is in no better position than one
who has no counsel at all.
271
The right to effective assistance of counsel extends to any pro-
ceeding where there is a constitutional right to counsel. In other
263 See Edward A. Adams, Lauryers Cost City $12 Million Last Year, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 16,
1992, at 1.
264 See generally Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 183.
265 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
266 Id. at 71.
267 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
268 Id. at 76.
269 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
270 Id. at 402.
271 Id. at 396.
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words, the constitutional right to counsel that is grounded in
either the Sixth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, or the Equal
Protection Clause is the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Where there is no such constitutional right, the same constitu-
tional requirement of effective assistance of counsel does not ap-
ply.272 In Wainwright v. Torna,273 the defendant claimed to have
been denied effective assistance of counsel when his retained attor-
ney failed to file a timely application for discretionary review.27 4
The Court noted that "[s]ince respondent had no constitutional
right to counsel, he could not be deprived of the effective assist-
ance of counsel by his retained counsel's failure to file the applica-
tion timely."
2 75
Over the years the courts have allowed appeals based on de-
fense counsel failures in several areas. Some examples include the
failure to investigate, 276 to consult sufficiently with the defend-
ant,27 7 to adequately represent client interests in plea bargain-
ing, 27 8 to move to suppress illegally obtained evidence, 2 7 9 and to
raise or properly present various available defenses.280
In Strickland v. Washington,28 1 and United States v. Cronic,
28 2
which were announced the same day, the Supreme Court sought to
provide a general framework for the analysis of ineffective assist-
ance claims. Both opinions noted that the critical element of inef-
fective assistance claims is to evaluate the performance of counsel
in light of the underlying purpose of the constitutional right to
counsel.283 In Strickland the Court noted that the objective of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel was to provide the "basic ele-
ments of a fair trial."284 Because the essential character of a fair
trial is our adversarial system of litigation, effective assistance
claims must be measured by reference to the proper functioning of
272 See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
273 455 U.S. 586 (1982).
274 Id. at 586-87.
275 Id. at 587-88.
276 In reJones, 917 P.2d 1175, 1179-82 (Cal. 1996).
277 State v. Savage, 577 A.2d 455, 466-69 (N.J. 1990).
278 Mitchell v. State, 762 S.W.2d 916, 922 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (citing Diaz v. Mar-
tin, 718 F.2d 1372, 1378 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 976 (1984)).
279 State v. Fisher, 874 P.2d 1381, 1384-85 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
280 DeLuca v. Lord, 858 F. Supp. 1330, 1346-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd, 77 F.3d 578
(2d Cir. 1996), and cert. denied (1996).
281 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
282 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
283 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685, 692; Cronic, 466 U.S. at 655-56.
284 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685.
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the adversarial process in a particular case. 285 Therefore, the criti-
cal question is whether counsel's performance has been so lacking
that the process "los[t] its character as a confrontation between
adversaries, "286 leading to an "actual breakdown of the adversarial
process."
287
The concept of effective assistance of counsel stated in Strick-
land and Cronic allows a constitutional challenge only when a de-
fendant can establish that counsel actually failed in some respect to
discharge his duties and that the failure affected the adversarial
process to an extent that undermines the confidence in the out-
come of the proceeding. 288 The Court in Strickland emphasized
the importance of a fact-sensitive analysis of the nature and impact
of the attorney's representation under the circumstances of the
particular case.289 In Cronic, Justice Stevens recognized settings in
which there could be per se violations of the right to effective coun-
sel g.2 " First is the situation in which "counsel was either totally ab-
sent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage
of the proceeding."291 Second, Justice Stevens acknowledged that
there were "occasions when although counsel is available to assist
the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully
competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a
presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the
actual conduct of the trial. 2 92
A. Conflicts of Interest
It has long been recognized that the constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel entitles a defendant to the undivided
loyalty of his attorney.293 In Strickland, Justice O'Connor stated that
capable representation "entails certain basic duties,"29 4 and among
these duties is an obligation for lawyers to "avoid conflicts of inter-
est."29 5 The defendant will not receive a fair trial when his coun-
sel's decisions are affected by obligations to persons other than the
defendant. Thus, a conflict of interest is present when defense
285 Id. at 690.
286 Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656-57.
287 Id. at 657.
288 Id. at 656; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
289 466 U.S. at 690.
290 466 U.S. at 658-59.
291 Id. at 659 n.25.
292 Id. at 659-60.
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counsel has personal interests that affect their professional judg-
ment in representing the client.
296
Courts have not found a constitutional bar against representa-
tion in potential conflict of interest settings. 9 7 However, courts
have been willing to view representation in those settings as sus-
pect.298 They have also recognized that it is often impossible to
reconstruct the precise impact of an attorney's loyalty because a
conflict of interest arises from matters that are not reflected in an
appellate record. The reviewing courts have expressed the diffi-
culty in pinpointing acts or omissions at trial that are not readily
apparent from the record.299 Ultimately, the only person who
knows the true ramifications of a conflict is the defense attorney.
One response to this issue has been for courts to make a pre-
trial inquiry into an attorney's possible conflicts. However, if the
court itself is the source of the conflict, the inquiry is futile. There-
fore, the defendant is forced to utilize post-conviction review. The
prevailing standard for post-conviction review was established in
Cuyler v. Sullivan. °° In Cuyler the Supreme Court stated that "[i] n
order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant
who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual
conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance."
3 0 '
This does not require the defendant to establish that he or she has
been prejudiced by the attorney. Once a defendant "shows that a
conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representa-
tion" he or she is entitled to relief."0 2 Thus, there is no need to
establish that the Sixth Amendment violation might have adversely
affected the outcome of the case. Once the defendant demon-
strates both an actual conflict of interest (that the attorney was
placed in a situation where conflicting loyalties pointed in opposite
directions) and, as a result, the attorney proceeded to act against
the defendant's interests, prejudice would be presumed and auto-
matic reversal is required.
New York's scheme for compensating private attorneys creates
conflicts of interest that may result in claims of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel. Advocates cannot live in the vacuum of a single
296 See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 356 n.3 (1980).
297 SeeLightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 934 (1988).
298 See United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 278 (5th Cir. 1975)
299 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
300 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
301 Id. at 348.
302 Id. at 349-50.
135
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW
case. They must also consider office rent, support staff, and per-
sonal expenses as they allocate their time. The low fees paid to
those who represent the indigent force them to choose not only
how many of these cases they can take, but also the amount of time
they devote to each case. The abysmally low rates create inherent
conflicts of interest that undermine the quality of representation
an attorney is able to provide.
The process of compensation under Article 18-B is equally
flawed. Section 722 establishes caps on the total amount per case
an attorney may receive. An attorney can exceed those caps only
with the permission of the judge handling the case.3 04 Thus, the
attorney is financially beholden to the judge hearing the case. The
attorney's ability to choose how much time to devote to each case
and meet expenses as the case progresses depends upon the judge
handling the case. Therefore, attorneys may feel that they must
tailor their representation strategies to the quirks of the judge in
order to survive financially.
Attorneys who want to be appointed to future cases have to
keep in mind that judges are charged with appointing counsel.30 5
It is my experience that many judges are former prosecutors who
believe that defense attorneys who advocate zealously on behalf of
their indigent clients are wasting the court's time and the people's
money. Again, the inherent problem with a conflict of interest is
that it is only the attorney, and perhaps the judge, who know how
this affects the quality of legal representation in a particular case.
B. State Interference
Defendants are denied effective assistance of counsel when the
state interferes with counsel's ability to make full use of trial proce-
dures.30 6 In Herring v. New York,3 ° 7 the Supreme Court noted that
"the right to the assistance of counsel has been understood to
mean that there can be no restrictions upon the function of coun-
sel in defending a criminal prosecution in accord with the tradi-
303 N.Y. CouNrrv LAw § 722-b (McKinney 1991).
304 Id.; see also Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 183, at 94.
305 N.Y. CouN-rv LAw § 722(4) (McKinney 1991).
306 See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1972) (holding that denying
counsel's input in deciding if and when a defendant will testify infringes on his or her
constitutional rights); see also Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 596 (1961) (holding
that denying defendant's counsel the right to ask defendant questions when he took
the stand denied him effective assistance of counsel).
307 422 U.S. 853 (1975).
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tions of the adversary fact finding process . .3.0."0' The critical
factor leading to the presumption of prejudice in state interference
cases flows from the role played by the state in restricting an attor-
ney's representation.3 9 The presumption of prejudice acts as a
protective measure designed to discourage state action that may
preclude effective representation.
New York's scheme for compensating private attorneys
amounts to state interference. This scheme thrusts the state into
the defense attorney's decision making process. Even if courts do
not consider this scheme as establishing a conflict of interest, they
cannot deny that these intrusions are the result of state action.
V. CONCLUSION
Article 18-B prohibits counsel from making full use of trial
procedures by forcing the attorney to run a financial gauntlet
throughout the entire course of a client's representation. This
gauntlet consists of the caps on the total amount an attorney may
receive and the manner in which it is dispensed.31 l These factors
inhibit the attorney in making all of the decisions necessary to pre-
pare and execute a zealous defense. Additionally, when judges
make the appointments of 18-B attorneys, it is obvious that the
state has injected itself into the indigent's defense. Therefore, the
18-B compensation scheme itself denies indigent defendants their
right to effective assistance of counsel.
This article points to what New York attorneys for the indigent
have known for some time: indigent criminal defendants are not
receiving equal protection of the laws. Similarly situated defend-
ants in New York and other state federal courts are receiving quali-
tatively better defense services. This unfair treatment of the
indigent defendant leads to wrongful convictions that pack our
prisons with wrongfully convicted defendants and robs the state of
money that could be spent elsewhere to reduce crime.
The Bill of Rights and the Due Process Clause were designed
to protect "a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for
efficiency and efficacy" that frequently characterizes government
officials. 311 How much longer will we allow the state to perpetuate
a society where some are more equal than others?
308 Id. at 857.
309 Id. at 857-59.
310 N.Y. Coum'rv LAW § 722-b (McKinney 1991).
311 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
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